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The Prosecutor's Obligation to 
Grant Defense Witness Immunity 
By Bennett L. Gershman* 
The author enumerates the three most common situations in 
which the courts have required the prosecutor to offer immunity to 
defense witnesses: (/) to safeguard the defendant's right to essential 
exculpatory testimony; (2) where the use of the prosecutor's powers 
to grant immunity causes such distortion in the fact-finding process 
as to require granting immunity to defense witnesses; and (3) where 
immunity is required to remedy prosecutory misconduct such as the 
intimidation of witnesses. The use of the "missing witness" instruc-
tion to avoid reaching the constitutional issue is also discussed. 
The recent trial of Bernhard Goetz, the subway gunman, 
focused attention on a recurring conflict in criminal justice 
between a defendant's right to a fair trial, and the enormous 
discretion of the prosecutor in deciding whom to prosecute and 
whom to absolve from criminal liability . Specifically, the case 
raised the question of the prosecutor's obligation, if any, to 
grant defense witness immunity. In Goetz, 1 the prosecutor im-
munized two of the four victims, who testified against Goetz. 
The defense sought the testimony of a third victim, Barry Allen, 
but he refused to testify unless granted immunity. The prosecu-
tor refused to grant Allen immunity as a matter of "trial strat-
egy." Assuming that such refusal was arbitrary and impaired 
the defendant's ability to mount a complete defense, what rem-
edies are available, if any, to repair the harm? 
Authority of Prosecutor 
As a general rule, the prosecutor has exclusive statutory 
authority to grant immunity to potential witnesses, and his 
discretion in using this important law enforcement tool is vir-
* Practicing Attorney, White Plains, New York. 
I People v. Goetz, 516 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Sup. Ct.1987). 
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tually unfettered. 2 Occasions may arise, however, when, as in 
the Goetz case, the defense seeks to have a reluctant witness 
granted immunity, a for example when a particular witnes ' 
can give favorabl testimony for the defendant but refuse to 
testify on grounds of e lf-incriminati n. Can the defendant in 
such circumstances require the prosecutor to grant defense wit-
ness immunity?3 And if the prosecutor refuses, does the court 
have inherent power to confer immunity? 
The problem has con titutional overtones. The prosecutor's 
refusal to grant defense witnes immunity can deprive the de-
fendant of his due process right to a fair trial,4 as well as his 
Sixth Amendment right to use compulsory process to obtain 
favorable witnesses. s Some courts draw an analogy between the 
prosecutor's refusal to grant defense witness immunity and his 
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence as required under 
Brady v. M myland, 6 for both actions can violate a similar right 
of the defendant by depriving him of exculpatory evidence, 
which is necessary to present an effective defense. 
Although the Supreme Court has not decided this issue, 
lower courts have confronted the problem in different ways 
depending on the circumstances giving rise to a defense request 
for immunity. The courts generally agree that prosecutors can-
2 See 18 U.S.c. ** 6002, 6003 (1970); N .Y. Crim. Proc. Law ** 50.20, 50.30 
(McKinney 1967); United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978). 
) An important distinction should be made between granting lransactional immu-
nity, which protects the witness from prosecution for the ubSlantive maller about 
which he give evidence (sec N. Y. rim. Proc. L'lW * 50.20 (M Kinney 1967), 
pmviding transactional immunity) , and lise immunity , which protects the witne only 
from having hi s testimony and derivative informaii n used against· him . See 18 
U.S .. * 6002 (providing use and derivative use immunity). To pass constitutional 
muster, an immunity statute need confer only use immunity. Kastigar v. United 
States. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). In onsidering defense witness immunity, the scope of 
the immunity is clearly a relevant concern. Compare Earl v. Uniled States, 361 F.2d 
531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), eel'l . denied, 388 U.S . 921 (1967) (transactional immunity) with 
United SLate' v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978) (use immunity) . 
4 United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978). 
5 See Western, "The Compulsory Process Clause, " 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71,166-170 
(1974). 
6373 U.S. 83 (1963); see United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512,515-516 (4th Cir. 
1979); United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955, 985 n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also 
Note, "Right of Criminal Defendant to Compelled Testimony of Witness," 67 
Colum. L. Rev. 953, 958 (1967). 
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not be required to grant witnesses statutory immunity. 7 Most 
courts further refuse to confer judicial immunity upon witnesses 
even when the witness can provide essential exculpatory infor-
mation available from no other source. 8 These courts reason 
that first, such immunity decisions would carry the judiciary 
into policy assessments that are the traditional domain of the 
executive branch9 and second, immunity would be subject to 
abuse by the defense. 10 
To be sure, the opportunities for abuse by the defendant of 
immunity are considerable. It is not difficult to imagine that 
many more defendants would produce witnesses willing to give 
exculpatory testimony but only if they were granted immunity. 
Improper collusive arrangements would be encouraged to the 
prosecutor's detriment. Defendants would obtain the benefit of 
possibly fabricated evidence and the source of that evidence 
might escape prosecution by virtue of immunity. Even limiting 
the immunity granted these witnesses to use immunity would 
still make the prosecutor's task difficult. If the prosecutor was 
required to dispense even limited-use immunity to such wit-
nesses, the prosecutor, if he subsequently chose to prosecute 
that witness, would have the burden of showing that his evi-
dence did not derive from the immunized testimony. 11 
On the other hand, some courts have invoked their inherent 
authority to dispense immunity in special circumstances, most 
notably when the witness can offer crucial exculpatory tes-
7 United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
1077 (1980; United States v. Bowling, 666 F.2d 1052, 1055 (6th Cir. 1981). 
8 Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v; Thevis, 665 
F.2d 616, 639 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); United States v. Graham, 548 F.2d 1302, 1315 (8th Cir. 
1976); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534-535 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 
U.S. 921 (1967). 
9 United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1980) , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
1077 (1981) ("confronting the prosecutor with a choice between terminating prosecu-
tion of the defendant or jeopardizing prosecution of the witness is not a task con-
genial to the judicial function"). 
10 In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1973) ("a person suspected ofacrime 
should not be empowered to give his confederates an immunity bath"). 
11 Kastigar V. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). By similar reasoning, Federal 
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), distrusting declarations against penal interest used to 
exonerate a defendant, requires corroboration before such statements may be intro-
duced. 
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timonyl2; when the prosecutor one-sidedly immunizes certain 
witnesses who testify for the government but refuses to grant 
reciprocal immunity to other witnesses who can give helpful 
testimony for the defendant l3 ; and when the prosecutor, by 
threats or other misconduct, intimidates defense witnesses into 
refusing to testify. 14 
Immunity for Essential Exculpatory Testimony 
Several courts have held that due process requires granting 
immunity to defense witnesses to safeguard the defendant's 
right to essential exculpatory testimony and compulsory pro-
cess. IS In Virgin Islands v. Smith,16 the defendant requested 
immunity for an exculpatory witness who was under the juris-
diction of the juvenile authorities of the Virgin Islands attorney 
general. That office offered the witness immunity on the condi-
tion (prompted by prosecutorial courtesy) that the U.S. attor-
ney consent. For unexplained reasons, the consent was refused. 
The Third Circuit held that judicial immunity was available 
when (1) immunity was properly sought in the district court, (2) 
the witness was available to testify, (3) the proffered testimony 
was both essential and clearly exculpatory, and (4) no strong 
governmental interests countervailed against an immunity 
grant. 17 
Several circuits have disagreed with the Third Circuit's 
approach. IS Other courts, while denying immunity in the cases 
12 Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); People v. Owens, 97 
A.D.2d 855,469 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dep't 1983), rev'd, 63 N.Y.2d 824, 472 N.E.2d 26, 
482 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1984); State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App. 2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 890 
(1974). 
i3 United States v. Saettele, 585 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1978) (dissenting opinion); 
United States v. DePalma, 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); People v. Chin, 67 
N.Y.2d 22,490 N.E.2d 505, 499 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1986); People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 
241,423 N.E.2d 379, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1981). 
14 United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976); People v. Shapiro, 50 
N.Y.2d 747, N.E.2d 897,431 N.Y.S.2d 422,409 (1980). 
IS United States v. Chitty, 760 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1985); Virgin Islands v. Smith, 
615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978); 
People v. Owens, 97 A.D.2d 855, 469 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dep't 1983), rev'd, 63 N.Y.2d 
824,472 N.E.2d 26, 482 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1984). 
16 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). 
17 [d. at 972. 
18 See cases cited at note 7 supra. 
17 
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 
before them, have left pen the possibility that immunity could 
be granted in a particular case if the defendant's interest out-
weighed any legitimate prosecution interest. 19 The Second Cir-
cuit, in United Slates l. Turk.ish,20 set forth its own balancing 
test, as follows: . 
No duty is imposed upon the prosecutor; he simply has an option to rely 
upon the witness' status as an actual or potential larget of prosecution to 
foreclose any inquiry concerning immunity for lhat witness. If a ca e 
should arise where the witness is not an indicted defendant and the 
prosecutor cannot or prefers not to present any claim that the witness i 
a potential defendant, and if the defendant on triaJ demon tnued that the 
witness' testimony will clearly be materiaJ, exculpat ry, and not 
cumulative, it will be time enough to decide whether in those circum-
stances a court has any proper role wilh respect to defense witness 
immunity.21 
Reciprocal Immunity 
The prosecutor's uneven and discriminatory use of his pow-
ers to grant immunity might so distort the fact-finding pro-
cess as to require granting immunity to defense witnesses.22 
Thi suggestion of a reciprocal immunity rule originated in Earl 
v. United Stales,23 in a decision by former Chief Justice (then 
circuit judge) Burger. In Earl, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of CoLumbia heJd that the government's refusal to grant 
immunjty to a discharged co-defendant and require him to tes-
tify did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. The court, 
however, noted that a defendant in some circumstances could 
be deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor's uneven use of his 
immunity-granting powers: 
We might have quite different, and more difficult, problems had the 
Government in this case secured testimony from one eyewitness by 
19 United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 517-520 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
446 U.S. 908 (1980); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1081-1082 (9th Cir.), 
cert . denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); People v. Sapia, 41 N.Y.2d 160, 359 N.E.2d 688, 
391 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1976), cerro denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977). 
20 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981). 
21 [d. at 778-779; see also United States v. Chitty, 760 F.2d 425, 429 (2d Cir. 1985). 
22 United States v. Hetman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978) (prosecutor 
withholds immunity with "deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact-finding 
process"); see also United States v. D'Antonio, 801 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1986). 
23 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967). 
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granting him immunity while declining to seek an immunity grant for 
Scott to free him from possible incrimination to testify for Earl. That 
situation would vividly dramatize an argument on behalf of Earl that the 
statute as applied denied him due process. Arguments could be ad-
vanced that in a particular case the Government could not use the 
immunity statute for its advantage unless Congress made the same 
mechanism available to the accused. 24 
This suggestion in EarL was applied in a decision in the 
Southern District of New York in United States v. DePaLma. 25 
There, the prosecutor gave immunity to certain individuals in-
volved in a racketeering scheme but refused to grant immunity 
to other participants. The court specifically held, as follows: 
Where the foundation of the government's case against Horowitz [the 
defendant] was built by means of a farreaching immunity grant, and 
where the evidence sought by the defendant is affected by the govern-
ment's continuing investigation of the potential defense witnesses, the 
denial of limited use immuf!ity resulted in an unfair trial. 26 
The court concluded that the appropriate relief would be not 
to dismiss the indictment but rather to grant a retrial wherein the 
government witnesses' testimony would be excluded unless 
required-use immunity was granted to potential defense wit-
nesses. 27 
Immunity to Remedy Prosecutorial Misconduct, Such as 
Intimidation of Witnesses 
As noted previously, courts have recognized the potential 
for prosecutorial abuse in the uneven granting of, or refusal to 
grant, witness immunity with the deliberate intention of distort-
ing the fact-finding process. 28 A flagrant example of such mis-
conduct is forcing a defense witness into silence by threatening 
prosecution if the witness chooses to testify. Courts have rem-
24 ld. at 534 n.l (emphasis in original) . 
2S 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N .Y. 1979). 
26ld. at 781. 
27 See also United States v. Saettele, 585 F.2d 307, 310-314 (8th eir. 1978). 
28 See also United States v. LaCoste, 721 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1983) (prosecutor's 
refusal to stipulate to conversation with witnesses who refused to testify "reprehen-
sible conduct"). 
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edied such abuses by requiring that the witness be granted 
immunity as a condition to subjecting the defendant to trial. In 
United States v. Morrison,29 for example, the prosecutor im-
properly caused the defendant's principal witness to withhold 
her testimony out of fear of self-incrimination. The prosecutor 
repeatedly warned the witness of the possibility of a federal 
perjury charge if she testified and conducted a highly intimidat-
ing personal interview with the witness prior to trial. To cure 
such misconduct, the court ordered a new trial, stating that "in 
the event the defendant calls Sally Bell as a witness, if she 
invokes her fifth amendment right not to testify, a judgment of 
acquittal shall be entered unless the Government, pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. 6002, 6003, requests use immunity for her tes-
timony. ' , 30 
Similarly, in People v. Shapiro,31 the prosecutor repeatedly 
threatened several important defense witnesses with perjury 
charges if they gave testimony for the defendant that differed 
from testimony they had previously given. The witnesses re-
fused to testify unless granted immunity and the defendant was 
convicted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the con-
viction and authorized a new trial only if the prosecutor ex-
tended immunity to these witnesses. A prosecutor's warning to 
potential witnesses of their possible liability for fal e state-
ments, said the court, "must not be emphasized to the point 
where they are transformed instead into instruments of intimi-
dation." The prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity, couched 
in such "menacing terms," served no purpose other than to 
bind the witnesses irretrievably to their previous sworn state-
ments, accurate or not. "By doing this, it impermissibly af-
fected their meaningful exercise of their Fifth Amendment 
rights and insured their unavailability as witnesses for the de-
fendant. "32 
29 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976). 
30Id. at 229. Other courts have acknowledged the role of use immunity as a 
remedy for this type of prosecutorial behavior. See United States v. Lord, 711 F .2d 
887 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188 (lst Cir. 1980). 
31 50 N.Y.2d 747, 409 N.E.2d 897, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1980) . 
3Z It!. at 761,409 N.E.2d at 904,431 N.Y.S.2d at 429. 
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The "Missing Witness" Instruction 
There are circumstances in which a court may provide an 
effective remedy against the prosecutor's refusal to grant a 
witness immunity without reaching the constitutional issue by 
means of the so-called missing witness inference. A good illus-
tration is found in the Goetz case itself. 33 
In that case, the prosecution called one witness, Barry Al-
len, on its direct case. Allen invoked his Fifth Amendment 
privilege and the prosecution refused to offer him immunity. 
The People had already immunized two other witnesses to the 
events on which the defendant was indicted for attempted mur-
der and other felonies. As mentioned earlier,34 it was acknowl-
edged by the prosecution that immunity was being withheld 
from Allen as a matter of trial strategy and that the prosecution 
had no interest in pressing criminal charges against Allen. 35 
Defendant then sought a "missing witness" charge to the 
jury that "they may infer if they wish, that the testimony of 
Barry Allen would not have been favorable to the People. "36 
Such a charge is appropriate when "there is an available, un-
called witness in a position to give material evidence that is not 
simply cumulative and that would naturally be expected to be 
favorable to the party who has failed to call him. "37 
The court considered the elements of the missing witness 
charge and concluded that Allen qualified as such a witness and 
that defendant had established a right to the charge. At this 
point, the court explained, "the burden shift[ed] to the prosecu-
tor to account for the absence of the witness or to demonstrate 
that the charge would be inappropriate. "38 
While conceding that a witness who invokes his privilege 
against self-incrimination is unavailable for many purposes,39 
33 People v. Goetz, 516 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (S. Ct. 1987). 
34 See text at p. 14 supra. 
35 Goetz, N.Y.S.2d at 1008. 
36/d. at 1010. The case, according to the opinion, presented the question for the 
first time in New York State. 
37 [d. at 1008 (citing J. Richardson, Evidence § 92, at 66 (10th ed. Prince 1970)). 
38 Goetz, N.Y.S.2d at 1009. 
39 See, e.g., People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 94, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825, 257 N.E.2d 16 
(admission against penal interest); Richardson on Evidence §§ 258, 260; Fed. R. 
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this factor will enable a prosecutor to escape a missing witness 
inference only if he furnishes a reasonable explanation for his 
failure to offer immunity. 40 
At this point, the assistant district attorney argued that the 
People need not offer any ~xplanation for its failure to confer 
immunity since this matter was one of prosecutorial discretion. 
While conceding that the discretion was broad, the court found 
it was reviewable for abuse. It said: "Contrasting any reason-
able grounds for withholding immunity, the case at bar exhibits 
selectivity among the shooting victims [in the granting of immu-
nity] that goes without explanation other than trial strategy. 
This is insufficient to carry the People's burden of demonstrat-
ing that the missing witness charge is inappropriate. To counte-
nance such a strategy would rouse profound constitutional 
questions of the defendant's right to confront the witnesses 
against him under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States and to his right to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.' '41 
When, as in the Goetz case, a "missing witness" instruction 
is given, the instruction may be of far greater benefit to the 
defense than the witness's testimony. The instruction not only 
suggested that Allen's testimony would have been unfavorable 
to the defense, but also permitted the jury to speculate on the 
prosecutor's motive in not calling the witness. 
Conclusion 
The judiciary's somewhat tentative response to the prosecu-
tor's refusal to grant defense witness immunity reflects a more 
general reluctance by the courts to interfere with the prosecu-
tor's exercise of discretion absent a showing of misconduct or 
abuse. This reluctance is noticeable in other important areas of 
prosecutor decision making such as charging, plea bargaining, 
and dismissals. The courts' deference is accountable, in part, to 
the theory of separation of powers and also the fear of abuses of 
the immunity laws. When, however, the prosecutor uses his 
Evid. 804 (admissibility of former testimony, of statement against interest and of 
statements of personal or family history). 
40 State v. Dachtler, 318 N.W.2d 769,774 (N.D. 1982) (dictum). 
41 Goetz, N.Y.S.2d at 1010. 
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immunity-granting powers to distort the fact-finding process, 
a court may invoke due process to repair the damage. This 
distortion may occur, for example, when he builds a case by 
immunizing several government witnesses and refuses to im-
munize other participants, or threatens potential defense wit-
nesses with prosecution if they testify. 
Accommodating the interests of a reluctant witness who 
refuses to give evidence on- grounds of self-incrimination and 
the defendant's interest in a fair trial may ultimately require 
legislation. A statute could be enacted providing for limited-use 
immunity under the kinds of circumstances described in this 
article and authorizing the trialjudge to dispense immunity after 
certain statutory preconditions have been met, namely, a show-
ing of what the witness's testimony would be, his refusal to 
testify after properly asserting a privilege, and the reasons for 
the prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity. If the prosecutor 
does not provide satisfactory reasons for withholding immunity, 
the trial judge should be empowered to confer it. 
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